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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the Court of Appeals by Utah Code 
annotated 78-2a(2)(K) (1992) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & CONTROLLING LAW 
The following is presented to the court for review. 
1- Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err and rewrite a contract improvidently 
entered into at arms length or change the bargain indirectly because of supposed 
equitable principles by ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs. The Note at issue clearly does 
not specify any semi annual payment amounts that were due, yet the court ruled that 
specific semi- annual payments were not made, bringing the Note into default. 
Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P2d 748 (Utah 1982). 
2. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err in granting the Plaintiffs a Summary 
Judgment when there was a genuine issue of material fact. 
"Summary Judgment is appropriate... when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law". Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a 
question of law." Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108; Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah division of 
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Gordon v. CRS Consulting 
Engineers, 820 P2d 492 (Utah App 1991) 
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"A Contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain meanings of terms missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." Winegar, 813 P2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); CJ.Realty v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988) 
3. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err by ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs 
when in fact it is a fundamental principle of contact law that "any uncertainty with 
respect to construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who hafs] 
drawn the agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) 
Wilburn, 748 P.2d at 585 
4. Did Judge Sawaya/the Third District Court err by rendering a final judgment during 
the pre-trial conference (after having already denied Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment) without any new evidence being brought forth? Is this the purpose and intent 
of the pre-trial conference or was this a breach of Judicial Procedure? Utah code (1.08 
(7)). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case has to do with an ambiguously worded second mortgage (real estate contract) 
that was drafted by a real estate salesman. The Note makes mention of "Semi-Annual 
Payments" but it does not stipulate any specific amounts nor does it identify if the 
"payments" were to be made towards the principal, interest, or a combination of the 
two. Consequently, one of the parties involved (the Plaintiffs, who were not the 
original holders of the note) assumed that the payments were to be towards interest in a 
specific amount while the other party (the Defendants) assumed that the payments were 
optional payments towards principal. 
Shortly after the transaction was originally consummated, the original holder of the 
note subordinated it to William and Elvira Christopulos (the Plaintiffs/Appellees). 
Within one to two months after the subordination, the Plaintiffs sent the Curtis' (the 
Defendants/Appellants) a schedule of monthly payments. Said payment schedule was 
not part of the original note and does not constitute a binding contract between the 
Plaintiffs and the Defendants. Even if said payment schedule was a binding contract, it 
also neglects to specify whether the payments were being made towards interest, 
principal or a combination of the two and the payment amounts are not specified in the 
Note. 
The Defendants wanted to make payments towards the balloon payments from time to 
time rather than make the total payments at the time they became due. They were 
therefore willing to make semi annual payments for a time. The Dispute arose when the 
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Defendants chose not to make a semi-annual payment and the Plaintiffs accused them 
of being in default. 
When the first balloon payment eventually came due, the Defendants tried to pay the 
specified amount of the balloon payment minus the total amount of semi-annual 
payments which had previously been paid towards principal but the Plaintiffs refused 
said payment claiming that the previous payments were interest payments not principal 
payments. 
The Plaintiffs motioned for a Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge Sawaya 
on 2/13/92. A non-Jury trial was set for 9/22/92 but during the pre-trial conference 
Judge Sawaya told the Defendant in the presence of the Plaintiffs Legal Council that if 
he (the Defendant) did not work out a settlement with the Plaintiffs, he would rule in 
favor of the Plaintiffs at trial. The Judge admitted the Note was ambiguous but said he 
could only assume what the intent of the note must have been. 
Following the pretrial conference the Plaintiffs resubmitted a motion for Summary 
Judgment which the Judge granted even though no new evidence had been presented. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
* On February 1st 1987 the Defendants, signed a trust deed note in the amount of 
$13,500.00 constituting a second mortgage on a home located at 4284 South Albright 
Dr. in Holiday Utah. The original holder of the note was Darrell B. Hincks. 
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* The Defendants never met or personally dealt with Mr. Hincks. The transaction was 
handled by Mr. Hincks' agent and business partner, Mr. Eric Glenn. Mr. Glenn was 
the one who drafted the trust deed note in behalf of Mr. Hincks'. Shortly after the 
transaction was made the note was subordinated to the Plaintiff. 
* The note stipulates that the $13,500.00 with a 5.7% per annum interest on the unpaid 
balance be paid in three balloon payments on the following dates; 
$4,000.00 2/1/1992 
$4,000.00 2/1/1997 
$5,500.00 (together with accrued interest) 2/1/2002 
* The note is quite specific about the amounts of the balloon principle payments and the 
dates they are to be paid. It is also clear that all accrued interest is to be paid at the 
time of the last balloon payment. 
* Nowhere in the note is there any specific amounts of "interest only" payments prior 
to the last balloon payment. 
The ambiguous part of the note is that it makes mention of "Semi-Annual Payments", 
but it does not stipulate any amounts nor does it identify if the "payments" were to be 
made toward the principal, interest, or a combination of the two. 
* The Defendants made 6 payments of approximately $384.75 each at various times. It 
was the Defendants contention that said payments were paid towards the principle 
amount of the first balloon payment in the note and that they were optional since no 
amount is specified by the note. The Plaintiffs contention was that said payments were 
"interest only" payments and that the note went into default when the payments 
stopped. 
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* The Defendants motioned for a Summary Judgment which was denied by Judge 
Sawaya on 2/13/92 
* The case was set for a non-jury trial before Judge Sawaya on 9/22/92 
* In the pretrial Conference on 9/14/92, Judge Sawaya acknowledged that the note was 
very ambiguous but said that the court could only assume what the intent of the note 
was. Judge Sawaya told the Defendant in the presence of the Plaintiffs Council that if 
he (the Defendant) did not work out a settlement with the Plaintiffs prior to the trial, he 
(Judge Sawaya) would have to rule in favor of Plaintiffs in Court. 
* The Defendents did not try to settle with the Plaintiffs because they knew that the 
Plaintiffs had little if any motivation to agree to a fair settlement since he knew he 
would win in Court based on the comments of the Judge. 
* Although no new evidence was produced during the pretrial, the Plaintiffs 
resubmitted a motion for summary judgment which was granted by Judge Sawaya on 
10/22/92 
* The Defendants motioned to Amend Judgment on 10/27/92 based upon the 
insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision. 
* Motion to amend judgment by the Defendants was denied by Judge Sawaya on 
11/23/92 
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SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
1- THE NOTE DID NOT EXPRESSLY REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF ANY 
CERTAIN AMOUNT UNTIL THE FIRST BALLOON PAYMENT WAS DUE 
FEBRUARY 1, 1992. SAID BALLOON PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THE 
DEFENDANT BUT REJECTED BY THE PLAINTIFF. BY RULING IN FAVOR OF 
THE PLAINTIFF, THE COURT WENT OUTSIDE THE BOUNDS OF THEIR 
JURISDICTION AND "REWROTE" THE CONTRACT TO PROVIDE A SPECIFIC 
AMOUNT OF "INTEREST ONLY SEMI-ANNUAL PAYMENTS". 
2- THERE ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT RELATING TO THE EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE THAT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
3- BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY WITH RESPECT TO THE VAGUE AND 
QUESTIONABLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONTRACT, IT SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN RESOLVED AGAINST THE PARTY WHO HAS DRAWN THE 
AGREEMENT. 
4- BY "ASSUMING" THE INTENT OF THE NOTE, RENDERING A FINAL 
VERDICT DURING THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE AND GRANTING A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFTER HAVING ONCE DENIED SAID 
MOTION, JUDGE SAWAYA SHOWED PERSONAL BIAS AND PREJUDICE AND 
MADE A PROCEDURAL BREACH. 
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5- THE DEFENDANT HAS ACQUIRED EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY 
UNAVAILABLE TO THE COURT INDICATING THAT ERIC JOHNSON, THE 
DRAFTER OF THE NOTE DID NOT INTEND TO HAVE SPECIFIC AMOUNTS 
OF INTEREST ONLY SEMI-ANNUAL PAYMENTS. 
ARGUMENT 
1- THE NOTE DID NOT EXPRESSLY REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF ANY 
CERTAIN AMOUNT UNTIL THE FIRST BALLOON PAYMENT WAS DUE 
FEBRUARY 1, 1992. SAID PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THE PETITIONER BUT 
REJECTED BY THE RESPONDENT. THE COURT HAS REWRITEN THE 
CONTRACT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
An objective reading of the language of the Note reveals that the first payment called 
for is a $4,000.00 principal payment on February 1, 1992. It is true that the Note does 
refer to "semi-annual payments commencing August 1 and February 1 semi-annually", 
however, the Note does not state the amount of any such payments nor does it state 
whether such payments constitute payment of principle or interest. 
By ruling in favor of the Respondent, the Court rewrote the contract to provide for a 
certain payment "amount" and rewrote the contract to stipulate that said payment was 
an "interest only" payment. The judgment of the Court was not supported by law or 
facts. Indeed, it is not for a Court to rewrite a contract improvidently entered into at 
arms length or to change the bargain indirectly because of supposed equitable 
principles. Dalton v. Jerico Construction Co., 642 P2d 748 (Utah 1982). Respondents 
predecessor dictated the terms of the Note and then had his agent draft the Note. The 
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Respondent must live with the terms of the Note without outside intervention from the 
Court. 
2. EVEN IF THE COURT FINDS AN AMBIGUITY IN THE NOTE, THERE 
ARE QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WHICH 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Alternatively, the Court may have found that the Note is sufficiently ambiguous as to 
warrant the admission of parol or extrinsic evidence relevant to determining whether 
the Note requires any certain semi annual payment. However, there are questions of 
fact which should have precluded any summary judgment in this case. 
"Summary judgment is appropriate... when there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. " Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991). "Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a 
question of law. "Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108; Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah division of 
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990); Gordon v. CRS Consulting 
Engineers, 820 P2d 492 (Utah App 1991) 
" A contract provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings of terms missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies.'" Winegar, 813 P.2d at 108 (quoting Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 
1292, 1293 (Utah 1983); C J . Realty v. Willey, 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah App. 1988) 
In this case there were significant questions of fact regarding the extrinsic evidence 
which the Respondent had proffered in their motion papers or which they may have 
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introduced at trial. At a minimum, the Petitioner was entitled to an opportunity to 
respond to the evidence which may have been put forth by the Respondent, to cross 
examine any witnesses and to produce additional extrinsic evidence for consideration by 
the Court. 
3. AT BEST, THE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE WAS INCONCLUSIVE AND THE 
NOTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSTRUED AGAINST ITS DRAFTER 
Once ambiguity has been found in a contract, and extrinsic evidence is deemed 
inconclusive, irrelevant, or unavailable, a court still uncertain as to the intention of the 
parties should construe ambiguities against the drafter of the contract. Wilburn, 748 
P.2d at 585; see Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); 17A AM. Jur. 2D 
Contracts & 339 (1991). 
It is a fundamental principle of contract law that "any uncertainty with respect to 
construction of a contract should be resolved against the party who hajs} drawn the 
agreement." Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982). 
In this case the Respondents did not produce any relevant extrinsic evidence regarding 
the intent of the parties. Their "extrinsic evidence" consisted of an affidavit of one of 
the Plaintiffs who was not even a party to the original contract and had no part 
whatsoever in the negotiation or drafting of the Note. The extrinsic evidence posited by 
the Respondent was profoundly inconclusive, and the Note should have been construed 
against its drafter, the Respondents predecessor in interest. 
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4. BY RENDERING A FINAL VERDICT DURING PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE, JUDGE SAWAYA SHOWED PERSONAL BIAS AND PREJUDICE 
AND MADE A PROCEDURAL BREACH. 
As mentioned under "Applicable Facts" in this docketing Statement, in the Pre-Trial 
Conference, Judge Sawaya acknowledged that the note was ambiguous but said that the 
court could only assume what the intent of the note was. He told the Petitioner in the 
presence of the Respondents Council that if he did not work out a settlement with the 
Respondent prior to the trial, he, (Judge Sawaya) would rule in favor of the Respondent 
at trial. 
According to the rules of Pre-Trial Conference (1.08 (7)) See also the enclose "Order 
for Pre-Trial Settlement Conference and for Appearance of Counsel and Parties" 
document which was issued by the Third District Court. "The purpose of Pre-Trial 
Conference is to effect a settlement of the case". In addition to "Settlement", "Other 
problems such as withdrawal of counsel, failure to respond to discovery, witness 
problems, trial conflicts, requests for continuences, etc, will be resolved at the 
conference". 
It is not the purpose of the Pre-Trial Conference to render a verdict in the case prior to 
the Trial Date. By rendering a premature verdict in favor of the Respondent, Judge 
Sawaya greatly hindered the Petitioners' potential ability to negotiate any kind of a 
reasonable settlement, therefore the Respondent made no attempts at settlement. Such 
biased actions on the part of Judge Sawaya constitute a serious breach of Judicial 
Procedure. 
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5. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE HAS SURFACED THAT CLARIFIES THE 
MEANING AND INTENT OF THE NOTE, SHOWING THAT NO INTEREST 
PAYMENTS WERE INTENDED TO BE PART OF THE CONTRACT. 
The Petitioner has just recently obtained a copy of another Note that was drafted by the 
same agent, Mr. Eric Glenn, using the same Trust Deed Note Form. It was drafted 
about two weeks earlier than the note at issue was drafted. In this particular Note, the 
parties agreed upon specific "interest" payments with a specified "amount". This note 
provides evidence that the drafter of the Note at issue was knowledgeable and 
competent enough to have specified if the payments were to have been a "specified 
amount" towards "interest". 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the five above mentioned Issues of Appeal, the Petitioners, Cory & 
Arwella Curtis submit to the Utah Court of Appeals that the Summary Judgment 
rendered by the Judge Sawaya is not supported by the Law or Facts for the following 
reasons; 
1- The Note does not expressly require any specified interest payments to be made 
prior to the last balloon payment and the Court has no authority to rewrite the contract 
improvidently, at arms length, after the fact. 
2- A Summary Judgment is inappropriate in this case because there was significant 
and genuine issue of material fact. The Petitioner is entitled to an opportunity to 
respond to the evidence at trial for consideration by the Court. 
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3- At best, the extrinsic evidence was inconclusive and the Note should have been 
construed against it drafter. 
4- By rendering a Pre-Trial Verdict, the Judge committed a serious break of 
Judicial Procedure. 
5- Additional evidence has surfaced that could not have been made available to the 
Court at the time of trial. This evidence proves that the drafter had previously drafted a 
Note with specific "Interest" payments in specified "amounts". The drafter was 
therefore knowledgeable and competent enough to have made these types of 
specifications had there been an agreement between parties to do so. 
The Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests this court to reverse the district court's 
grant of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and remand the case for trial on 
the merits previously stated. 
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THE BENEFICIARY ACREES TO SUBORDINATED THIS TRUST DEED (ONE TIME ONLY, EITHER 
FOR A SECOND C* IF PROPERTY IS REFINANCED) TO A RELIABLE LENDER IN THE AREA., 
PER AGREEMENT OF BOTH PARTIES. 
Toftthat Trith all bufldinft, fUturat and improvamanta tharaon and all watar rifhta, rifhta of way, 
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tionad. and all othar avidanoaa of Indabtadnaaa aacurad by aald Truat Daad dalivarad to you hara* ffi 
with, iofathat with tha aaid Truat Daad, and to raoonvay, without warranty, to tha ptrtlaa daalg* ( 2 
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Cory and Arwella Curtis 
4284 S. Albright Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Dear Cory and Arwella Curtis, 
As you are aware, the 
August 1, 1987. The amount due 
payments are due as follows: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1/ 
1, 
If 
1, 
If 
If 
1, 
If 
If 
1, 
If 
If 
1987 
1988 
1988 
1989 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1991 
1992 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1994 
1994 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$384.75 
$4,384.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
August 1, 1987 
first payment on your note is due 
$384.75. The remainder of the 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
Aug. 
Feb. 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1, 
1995 
1995 
1996 
1996 
1997 
1997 
1998 
1998 
1999 
1999 
2000 
2000 
2001 
2001 
2002 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$270.75 
$4,270.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$156.75 
$5,656.75 
You might want to keep this letter for your records so that 
you may keep track ot your payments. 
Please make the checks payable to William and Elvira 
Christopolus. 
Sincerely, 
William and Elvira Christopolus 
2742 Dearborn Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
(801) 467-3828 
Mr. & Mrs. William Christopolus 1/30/92 
2742 Dearborn St. 
SLC Utah 84106 
Dear Bill, 
As you are aware, my first payment to you of $4,384.75 is 
"" Saturday, February 1, 1992. Since my contention is that 
I >iA not in violation of our agreement until said payment is 
inY|pfault, please find enclosed, the unpaid portion of the 
firpfc payment. 
Contrary to your claims that I havfe made only four payments 
to FJU, I have enclosed a copy of the sixth payment that I 
madfef to you, which you deposited into your account on 
03^9/90. It was check #810 for the amount of $384.75. I 
have als©> sent a copy to the court and to your attorney. 
£his makes the remaining portion of the first payment as 
follows; 
$4,384.75 
-2,308.50 
$2,076.25 
payment. 
Total first payment amount 
Minus six payments previously paid 
Enclosed remaining portion of total first 
I am expecting you to return the enclosed check since your 
contention is that the agreement has already been broken and 
have chosen to take legal action. I have enclosed a self 
addressed envelop for that purpose. 
***WARNING*** 
By cashing or depositing the enclosed payment, you are 
accepting the first payment of $4,384.75 as being PAID IN 
FULL!! If the check is not returned, cashed, or deposited 
within 15 days of the due date, I will stop payment on it. 
Sincerely, / • 
CORY R. CURTIS 11-84 ^ V f e ^ S f t S 
OR ARWELLA CURTIS j ^ ^ f t ^ © ? ^ 
168 WEST CENTER STREET 801 295-8985 _ / = _ Z _ 3 L _ = J 9 
NORTH SALT LAKE, UT 84054 
5 10 
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31-273/1240 
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T.H2753 TRUST DEED NOTE 
) NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
1 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 . s.?.A.^...^?.^...9..1..,:^.f...y.t:».ll 
February I i<£?.. 
FOR VALVE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
DARRELL B. HINCKS 
•H1RTEEN THOUSAND, FIVE HUNDRED AND NO/100 1 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
DOLLARS ($ ) , 
>gether with interest from date at the rate of.J.}y.L.$..P2L}.99. per cent (.£:..?....%) per annum on 
ic unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: . , . . 
r
* 'Semi-annual payment / commencing August 1, and February 1, ^ e m i - a n n u a l l y . 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l balance due February 1 , 1992 
$ 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l balance due February 1 , 1997 . 
$ 5 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 p r i n c i p a l t o g e t h e r w i t h accrued i n t e r e s t , due and payable on or b o l o r e 
February 1, 2002 . This note may be paid e a r l y w i thout uny p e n a l t y . Early f u l l 
payment of the e n t i r e note w i l l be s u b j e c t t o a payment based on $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 a t 
107, i n t e r e s t deduct ing any payments made. 
If payment i s not r e c e i v e d w i t h i n 15 days a f t e r due d a t e , a 5% l a t e f e e of monthly 
E^ rpaSvL m m^^ the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
tuch installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of...£l/A —~ ....—..per 
cent (...*!/.*..%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
a reasonable attorney's fee, 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or niodificatioos that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the irelease of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed 
4284 South A l b i r g h t Drive 
of even date herewith. 
**THIS TRUST DEED 
ONE TIME ONLY 
A REFI 
PA 
BE SUBORDINATED 
A SECOND OR ON 
MENT OF BOTH 
Arwella Curtis 
-¥-
> ^ 
»* Q / \ I ^ * WIAI TITLE AHB AISIKACTT <5«MPiVNY 
T-112045 TRUST DEED NOTE 
NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this nott, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
| 5 ,000 .00 Salt^Ljake^C^yA^Uetah 
January 20 j ~ 87 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
WILLIAM CHRISTOPULOS and ELVIRA CHRISTOPULOS, his wife as joint tenants 
"with'Tu'n* *r^  
FIVE THOUSAND AND NO/100 : ~ : " ~ = - ™ ^ ) . 
together with interest from date at the rate of .T?M per cent* (:. ..*. %) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follows: 
interest commences January 1, 1987. 
$100,00 or more each month commencing February 1, 1987, and $100.00 or more 
each month thereafter on the 1st day of each month until the entire principal 
balance together with interest is paid in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal Any 
such installment not paid when due shall bear interest thereafter at the rate of per 
20 0 
cent (......*.....%) per annum until paid. 
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
U this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
M without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
i reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
ind notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
vaivers or modifications that.may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note U secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith. 
6733 South 1560 East 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84121 
r%rr 3-l1-f7 
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